Circling on God Part 3

I have fallen behind in my blogging efforts and so had not gotten around to the last two posts in my series “Circling on God” that I began a while ago. If you have not read the first two posts in this series you can read them here and here. Just a quick refresher. These posts come from a paper written by a friend for a class called “Christian Mind” at Westminster Seminary California and taught by Michael S. Horton. The paper addresses the use of circularity in apologetics especially as it pertains to presuppositional and evidentialist methodology.

In this post Bryce’s paper discuses Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic methodology and then seeks to interact with some of the common objections raised against it. Here it is:

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Van Til’s presuppositional method seeks to undermine the foundations of the unbeliever’s thinking by bringing to light the inconsistencies that exist between his basic presuppositions and the claims he actually makes concerning God, himself, and the world. Van Til argued in light of Romans 1:18-21 that all men, through their observation of the creation, know the God of the Bible exists. As a result, at the outset of the unbeliever’s reasoning, he already knows to be true what he is seeking to disprove, namely that God exists.[1] Van Til also argued, as pointed out by Bruce Baker, that men seek to suppress the knowledge they have of God. [2]

Van Til maintains that this suppression of the truth they know makes the unbeliever a “covenant breaker,” one unfaithful to the covenant made at creation between man and God. By virtue of being God’s creatures, all of humanity is covenantally bound to God and responsible to him. But the unbeliever breaks this covenant principally by not reasoning and acting with God as his reference point at all times. Van Til claims that the goal of apologetics is to make men “self-consciously either covenant keepers or covenant breakers.”[3] In order to maintain this covenant fidelity, one must reason with God as the necessary condition for reasoning and interpret everything in creation in light of his revelation in the Scriptures.[4] The Christian apologist must call the unbeliever to repent of his sinful state of covenant infidelity to a position of interpreting God’s world with him as the final reference point. In other words, he or she must challenge the unbeliever to first admit God’s existence and supremacy and only then seek to understand the world around him.

This type of argumentation leads, however, to the charge of circular reasoning. Why should the unbeliever be expected to accept that God exists without being provided “valid” evidence to prove it? Van Til readily admits this presuppositional method to be “circular.” He writes, “The charge is made that we engage in circular reasoning. Now if it be called circular reasoning when we hold it necessary to presuppose the existence of God, we are not ashamed of it…” He goes on to explain in the same sentence why the existence of God must be his basic presupposition: “…because we are firmly convinced that all forms of reasoning that leave God out of account will end in ruin.”[5] Van Til affirms that in order to make any predication, one must first presuppose the existence of God. Van Til writes:

It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically self-conscious Christian that no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation, unless it were for God’s existence. Thus the transcendental argument seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must have, in order to be what it is.[6] [emphasis in original]

The unbeliever must accept God’s existence because he or she cannot reason at all without first presupposing it.

This method is said to be circular since it presupposes the truth claims of Christianity as the criteria with which reality is to be interpreted. However, Van Til qualifies his admission of the use of circularity in his apologetic. Van Til claims that his reasoning is not circular in the same sense that the unbeliever’s reasoning is circular. Van Til’s argument is merely consistent since he admits his presuppositions and interprets reality in light of them whereas the unbeliever is not consistent with his or her presuppositions. Van Til claims that while the unbeliever reasons in this type of vicious, self-defeating circle, the reasoning employed in presuppositional apologetics is “spiral.”[7] Val Til explains:

The method of implication as outlined above is circular reasoning. Or we may call it spiral reasoning. We must go round and round a thing to see more of its dimensions and to know more about it, in general, unless we are larger than that which we are investigating. Unless we are larger than God we cannot reason about him any other way, than by a transcendental or circular argument.[8] [emphasis in original]

Greg Bahnsen elaborates further on the point made here by Van Til when he writes, “It should be apparent…that the metaphysical character of any object has a bearing upon the way in which it is known, discovered, proven, interpreted, etc.”[9] In other words, the metaphysical character of the Creator God of the Bible is completely different from the metaphysical character of, say, a cup of coffee; thus reasoning about God and reasoning about a cup of coffee will look quite different. Since human beings are not larger than God, they must reason about him in a different manner than other facts of the universe. Thus when engaging in apologetics, the Christian can begin with any aspect of the universe and show how in order to correctly and consistently understand that fact, the unbeliever must interpret it in light of God’s revelation.

Instead of reasoning in a vicious circle, a presuppositional apologetic is simply consistent with its basic presuppositions. It assumes the existence of God and unashamedly bases its whole system upon that presupposition, ending up with a consistent argument. Bahnsen claims that…

[t]he ‘circularity’ of a transcendental argument is not at all the same as the fallacious ‘circularity’ of an argument in which the conclusion is a restatement…of one of its premises. Rather, it is the circularity involved in a coherent theory (where all the parts are consistent with or assume each other) and which is required when one reasons about a precondition for reasoning.[10]

The Christian apologist must assume the existence of God at the outset of his argument because God is the “precondition for reasoning,” or the foundation that makes belief in anything possible. By doing so, he or she is being consistent and coherent when they tell the unbeliever they must do so as well.

The Christian must call the unbeliever to repent of his or her suppression of the truth he already knows, all the while never sacrificing his belief in God as necessary to understand everything. This unashamed admission (and, in essence, proclamation) of the existence of God glorifies him because it not only ends in the conclusion that God exists, it presumes him to exist throughout the argument. Those who follow the exhortation found in 1 Peter 3:15 to “sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts” will allow Christ to govern and rule their whole lives, including the method they employ in their apologetic arguments. By assuming God at the outset of the argument, the presuppositional method correctly follows the exhortation in 1 Peter 3:15 and glorifies God as a result.

The presuppositional method as proposed by Van Til has received criticism for its apparent use of circularity. The evidentialist school of apologetics has generally criticized Van Til’s presuppositional method, claiming that it is an inadequate method to use because of its use of circularity, to name one reason. Proponents of this method include B.B. Warfield, J. Gresham Machen, and John W. Montgomery. For the purpose of this paper, Montgomery’s critique of Van Til’s apologetic will be examined.

First, it is worth briefly making clear what the evidentialist method entails. According to Montgomery, Christians and unbelievers alike must use “inductive procedures to distinguish fact from fiction.”[11] As mentioned above, the inductive method involves examining the particulars of the universe and reaching conclusions or generalizations based on the observation of those particular facts. Montgomery argues that anyone—believer or unbeliever—has the ability to examine the evidence for the validity of the Christian faith, and to compare the various interpretations of those facts to determine “on the basis of the facts themselves which interpretation best fits reality.” [12] [emphasis added] Montgomery argues that the goal of the evidentialist apologist is to present these facts to the unbeliever so as to convince them of the truth of Christianity by applying the “sheer pressure of incarnational fact.”[13] The evidentialist apologist expects the unbeliever’s inductive examination of the facts of the universe (whether taken from Scripture or not[14] ) to lead him to accept the truth claims of Christianity.

Montgomery has criticized Van Til and his presuppositional method for its use of aprioristic circularity. Montgomery argues that “…by accepting aprioristic circularity, [the presuppositionalist] at the same time eliminates all possibility of offering a positive demonstration of the truth of the Christian view.”[15] The way Montgomery sees it, the presuppositional argument brings the Christian and the unbeliever to an impasse where neither arguer will budge from their stance because neither arguer is willing to compromise their basic presuppositions. This is essentially the objection put forth by Walton (above) that the skeptic in the argument will not simply accept his opponent’s presuppositions without evidence to prove them. In Montgomery’s essay “Once Upon an A Priori,” he uses an example from a comic strip where two opposing imaginary groups from different planets argue against each other for the truth of their respective gods, Bibles and holy spirits. He tries to illustrate through this example the futility of the presuppositional argument. He assumes that two opposing worldviews can be internally consistent and while they both continue to argue within their own circles, they will arrive at no conclusion until the “facts” are appealed to.[16]

Montgomery is mistaken, however, in his assumption that other worldviews beside the Christian worldview can be consistent. Van Til argued that the Christian and non-Christian arguments are both

‘circular’ in the sense that each worldview attempts to regiment its presuppositions as a consistent and coordinated perspective on experience. Hypothetically, if both were consistent with their fundamental assumptions, the believer and the unbeliever would end up with an all-inclusive antithesis in their personal attitude and conceptual systems or outlooks, in which case they could not effectively exhibit to each other the rationality, coherence, or justification of their conceptions of rationality, coherence, or justification.[17] [emphasis added]

If the atheist or Muslim or Buddhist could be consistent in their fundamental assumptions of reality then Montgomery would be correct in his critique of presuppositionalism because there would be no point in attacking the foundations of a perfectly consistent worldview. However, as Van Til argues, only one worldview is ultimately correct and consistent, namely the Christian worldview, and all the facts of the creation must be interpreted within its framework or they will not be interpreted correctly.

What is the alternative to Van Til’s use of circularity in his argument? John Frame suggests that the only alternative would be to encourage the unbeliever to begin from either a non-Christian or “neutral” standpoint, and reason in a linear fashion from there in order to reach the conclusion that Christianity is valid.[18] But, as Frame points out, this would encourage the unbeliever to continue his disobedience to God’s covenant by adopting a non-Christian way of seeing the world. It would be dishonoring to God and dishonest to encourage the unbeliever’s sinful epistemological stance then asking him to renounce it and repent of it once he reached the correct conclusion. Furthermore, there is no neutral standpoint from which the unbeliever can reason, thus the Christian should not encourage the unbeliever to adopt such a stance.

Upon closer examination, the evidentialist apologetic is guilty of the same vicious circularity as the unbeliever. The important question to ask is: what does the evidentialist assume at the base of his thinking? If Montgomery argues that in order to distinguish fact from fiction all humans must use the inductive principle, he must therefore presuppose the validity of induction and the human’s ability to use it as a reliable method for deriving truth. He assumes that it is possible to use the inductive principle to understand reality without first relating reality to its Creator. This is the same vicious circle that the unbeliever catches himself in by assuming something to be true without any basis for believing it. In reality, the evidentialist (while certainly not deliberately in most cases) fails to glorify God as much as he or she could by having the unbeliever understand that he or she may understand facts about the universe without relating them to the God who created them.

Van Til ultimately rejects the evidentialist method because of the presumption of human autonomy that lies at the base of its philosophical system. Van Til rightly shows that if principles such as induction, the law of cause and effect, and the law of non-contradiction are intelligible without God, then the believer cannot consistently maintain that God is necessary when we consider the universe as a whole. [19] Similarly, Bahnsen claims that “[b]ecause autonomous philosophy does not provide the preconditions for rationality or reasoning, its ‘circles’ are destructive of human thought.”[20] By encouraging the unbeliever to take these principles for granted, the evidentialist encourages his opponent to use gifts God has given him without giving God glory and thanks for them. It circles on man’s autonomy and not on God.
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[1] Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1998), p. 185.

[2]Bruce A. Baker, “Romans 1:18-21 and Presuppositional Apologetics,” Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. 155 (July-September 1998 no 619): p. 295.

[3]Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1998), p. 66.

[4]Ibid, p. 67.

[5]Ibid, p. 519.

[6]Don Collett, “Van Til and the Transcendental Argument,” WTJ, 65 no.2, Fall 2003: p. 294.

[7]Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1998), p. 518.

[8]Ibid, p. 518.

[9]Ibid, p. 309 n. 98.

[10]Ibid, p. 518 n.122.

[11]John W. Montgomery, Faith Founded on Fact (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., Publishers, 1978), p. 122.

[12]Ibid, p. 122.

[13]Ibid, p. 122.

[14]Ibid, p. xxi.

[15]Ibid, p. 118.

[16] John W. Montgomery, “Once Upon an A-Priori,” in Jerusalem and Athens. ed. E.R. Geehan (Nutley: P&R Publishing Co., 1971), 385.

[17]Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1998), p. 483.

[18] John M. Frame, “Van Til and the Ligonier Apologetic,” Westminster Theological Journal 47 no2 (Fall 1985): p. 288.

[19]Ibid, p.591-592.

[20]Ibid, p. 518 n.122.

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Next time: the conclusion to “Circling on God”.